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1Power Allocation for Energy Efficiency and Secrecy
of Wireless Interference Networks
Zhichao Sheng, Hoang Duong Tuan, Ali Arshad Nasir, Trung Q. Duong and H. Vincent Poor
Abstract—Considering a multi-user interference network with
an eavesdropper, this paper aims at the power allocation to
optimize the worst secrecy throughput among the network links
or the secure energy efficiency in terms of achieved secrecy
throughput per Joule under link security requirements. Three
scenarios for the access of channel state information are con-
sidered: the perfect channel state information, partial channel
state information with channels from the transmitters to the
eavesdropper exponentially distributed, and not perfectly known
channels between the transmitters and the users with expo-
nentially distributed errors. The paper develops various path-
following procedures of low complexity and rapid convergence
for the optimal power allocation. Their effectiveness and viability
are illustrated through numerical examples. The power allocation
schemes are shown to achieve both high secrecy throughput and
energy efficiency.
Index Terms—Interference network, secure communication,
energy-efficient communication, power allocation, path-following
algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
The broadcast nature of the wireless medium exhibits dif-
ferent challenges in ensuring secure communications in the
presence of adversarial users [1], [2]. In particular, it is difficult
to protect the transmitted signals from unintended recipients,
who may improperly extract information from an ongoing
transmission without being detected [3], [4]. Physical layer
security [5], [6] has been proposed as a solution to provide
security in wireless networks and researchers with a goal being
to optimize the secure throughput of a wireless network in the
presence of eavesdroppers, which is the difference between
the desired user throughput and eavesdroppers’ throughput
[2]. Beyond secure throughput, significant interest has recently
been put on optimizing the secure energy efficiency (SEE),
which is the ratio of the secure throughput to the total network
power consumption, measured in terms of bits per Joule per
Hertz [7], [8].
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There has been considerable recent research on physical
layer security in wireless communication systems. For exam-
ple, assuming the availability of full channel state information
(CSI), secrecy optimization has been studied for cooperative
relaying networks in [9]–[11]. Energy efficiency (EE) of
wireless networks has also drawn attention. For examples,
resource allocation algorithms for the optimization of spectral
efficiency as well as EE have been established in [12]. Keeping
EE maximization as an objective, the authors in [13] proposed
a precoder design for multi-input-multi-output (MIMO) two-
way relay networks. EE maximization for cooperative spec-
trum sensing in cognitive sensor networks is studied in [14].
The critical topic of SEE has also been explored very
recently [7], [8], [15]–[20]. Specifically, power control al-
gorithms for SEE maximization in decode-and-forward (DF)
and amplify-and-forward (AF) relaying networks have been
considered in [15] and [7], respectively. In [16], the authors
developed a distributed power control algorithm for SEE
maximization in DF relaying. The same resource allocation
problem for SEE maximization assuming full-duplex relaying
is considered in [17]. Recently, the authors in [18] and [19]
also derived the trade-off between SEE and secure spectral
efficiency in cognitive radio networks, while the authors in
[21] considered similar problems for ultra-dense small cells
underlaid on macro cells. All these works have assumed the
perfect CSI knowledge at the transmitter end, which is not
always possible.
It is commonly known that time or frequency resources are
generally limited in wireless networks and thus have to be
shared among multiple users. This can result in interference
among users in the network and thus one has to opt for careful
resource allocation or interference alignment schemes [22].
Considering a multiuser MIMO interference network, [20]
used the costly interference alignment technique to cancel both
information leakage and interference and then Dinkelbach’s
method of fractional programming is adopted to optimize EE.
As shown in [8], both zero-forcing and interference alignment
are not efficient in optimizing the network SEE.
In this paper, we propose novel and efficient resource
allocation algorithms for both worst-case secure throughput
and worst secure energy efficiency maximization of a highly
interference-limited multi-user wireless network. Unlike many
previous works, we do not assume perfect CSI knowledge at
the transmitters. In fact, our transmitters only carry channel
distribution knowledge for the eavesdropper and imperfect
CSI for the users. Particularly, we consider three optimization
scenarios to gradually build our algorithms. We start with the
“perfect CSI” scenario. Next, we consider a “partial CSI”
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setup where the channel between the transmitters and the
eavesdropper is exponentially distributed and only that channel
distribution knowledge is available at the transmitters. Finally,
we solve for the hardest “robust optimization” scenario, where
in addition to the assumption of only channel distribution
knowledge about eavesdroppers, we also assume uncertain
channels between the transmitters and the users with expo-
nentially distributed errors. We develop various path-following
procedures of low complexity and rapid convergence for the
optimal power allocation. Our extensive simulation results
illustrate their effectiveness and viability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II, section III and section IV are devoted to optimizing the
links’ worst secrecy throughput and the network secure energy
efficiency under the perfect CSI, partial CSI and imperfectly
known CSI, respectively. The simulation is provided in Section
V to show the efficiency of the theoretical developments in the
previous section. Appendices provide fundamental rate outage
inequalities and approximations, which are the mathematical
base of the theoretical sections II-IV.
II. INTERFERENCE NETWORKS UNDER PERFECT CSI
We consider a cooperative network consisting of M single-
antenna transmitters and M single-antenna users as depicted
in Figure 1, where each transmitter i intends to send the
information si to user i. The information si is normalized,
i.e. E(x2i ) = 1. Let pi be the transmit power allocated to
transmitter i and p = (p1, . . . ,pM )T . Furthermore, denote by√
hji the path gain from transmitter j to user i. The received
signal at user i is
yi =
√
hiipisi +
M∑
j 6=i
√
hjipjsj + ni,
where ni ∈ CN (0, σ2i ) is additive noise.
Suppose that there is an eavesdropper (EV), which is also
equipped with a single antenna. Denoting by
√
hie the path
gain from transmitter i to the EV, the received signal at the
EV is
ye =
M∑
i=1
√
hiepisi + ne,
where ne ∈ CN (0, σ2e) is additive noise.
Under the perfect CSI at the transmitters, the information
throughput at user i is
fi(p) , ln
(
1 +
hiipi∑M
j 6=i hjipj + σ
2
i
)
. (1)
With the EV considered as part of the legitimate network,
the path gain
√
hie can also be assumed known [23]. The
wiretapped throughput for user i at the EV is
gi(p) , ln
(
1 +
hiepi∑
j 6=i hjepj + σ2e
)
. (2)
The secrecy throughput in transmitting information si to user i
while keeping it confidential from the eavesdropper is defined
as
max{fi(p)− gi(p), 0}. (3)
We consider the following fundamental optimization problems
in a such network: the maximin secrecy throughput optimiza-
tion
max
p
Φsp(p) , min
i=1,...,M
[fi(p)− gi(p)] (4a)
s.t. 0 < pi ≤ Pi, i = 1, · · · ,M, (4b)
and the network secure energy efficiency (SEE) maximization
under users’ secrecy throughput quality-of-service (QoS) re-
quirements
max
p
Φee(p) ,
M∑
i=1
[fi(p)− gi(p)]
ζ
M∑
i=1
pi + Pc
s.t. (4b), (5a)
fi(p)− gi(p) ≥ ci, i = 1, ..,M, (5b)
or the maximin transmitter EE optimization under users’
secrecy throughput QoS requirements
max
p
min
i=1,...,M
fi(p)− gi(p)
ζpi + P ic
s.t. (4b), (5b). (6)
Here ζ is the reciprocal of the drain efficiency of the power
amplifier, P ic is the circuit power at transmitter i and Pc =∑M
i=1 P
i
c . As the numerator in the objective function in (5)
is the sum secrecy throughput while the denominator is the
network power consumption, the objective function in (5)
expresses the network SEE in terms of nats/s/Joule. Similarly,
each subfunction in (6) expresses the SEE in for transmitting
the information si. Moreover, the constraint (5b) for given
thresholds ci sets the QoS for the users in terms of the secrecy
throughput. This constraint is nonconvex, which is in contrast
to the throughput constraint
fi(p) ≥ c˜i, i = 1, . . . ,M,
which is equivalent to the linear constraint
hiipi ≥ (ec˜i − 1)(
∑
j 6=i
hjipj + σ
2
i ), i = 1, . . . ,M.
A popular now approach [24] is to treat fi − gi in (4) as
a d.c (difference of two concave functions) function [25]:
3fi(p)−gi(p) = f˜i(p)− g˜i(p) with f˜i(p) = ln(
∑M
j=1 hjipj+
σ2i ) + ln(
∑M
j 6=i hjepj + σ
2
e) and g˜i(p) = ln(
∑M
j 6=i hjipj +
σ2i ) + ln(
∑M
j=1 hjepj + σ
2
e) which are concave. Then at each
iteration, f˜i is linearized while g˜i is innerly approximated by
a concave quadratic function for a lower approximation of
f˜i − g˜i [26], [27]. As a result, each iteration invokes solu-
tion of a simple convex quadratic optimization problem with
the logarithmic function optimization of high computational
complexity avoided.
Our next subsections are devoted to efficient computational
approach to solving each of (4), (5) and (6) without d.c.
representation.
A. Max-min secrecy throughput optimization
At every p(κ) ∈ RM+ , {(x1, . . . , xM )T : xk > 0, k =
1, . . . ,M}, applying inequality (72) in the Appendix II for
x = 1/hiipi, y =
∑M
j 6=i hjipj + σ
2
i and x¯ = 1/hiip
(κ)
i , y¯ =∑M
j 6=i hjip
(κ)
j + σ
2
i yields
fi(p) ≥ f (κ)i (p) (7)
for
f
(κ)
i (p) , ln(1 + x
(κ)
i ) +
x
(κ)
i
1 + x
(κ)
i
(
2− p
(κ)
i
pi
−
∑
j 6=i hjipj + σ
2
i∑M
j 6=i hjip
(κ)
j + σ
2
i
)
. (8)
On the other hand, applying inequality (75) in the Appendix
II for x = hiepi, y =
∑M
j 6=i hjepj and x¯ = hiep
(κ)
i , y¯ =∑M
j 6=i hjep
(κ)
j yields
gi(p) ≤ g(κ)i (p), (9)
for
g
(κ)
i (p) = ln(1 + x
(κ)
e,i ) +
1
1 + x
(κ)
e,i
×
(
0.5hie(p
2
i /p
(κ)
i + p
(κ)
i )∑M
j 6=i hjepj + σ2e
− x(κ)e,i
)
. (10)
Initialized by a feasible p(0) for the convex constraint (4b), at
the κ-th iteration we solve the convex optimization problem
max
p
Φ(κ)sp (p) , min
i=1,...,M
[f
(κ)
i (p)−g(κ)i (p)] s.t. (4b) (11)
to generate the next iterative point p(κ+1). As (11) involves M
decision variables and M linear constraints, its computational
complexity is O(M2M2.5 +M3.5) .
One can see that Φsp(p) ≥ F (κ)sp (p) ∀ p ∈ RM+ and
Φsp(p
(κ)) = F
(κ)
sp (p(κ)). Furthermore, Φ
(κ)
sp (p(κ+1)) >
Φ
(κ)
sp (p(κ)) if p(κ+1) 6= p(κ) because the former is the optimal
solution of (11) while the latter is its feasible point. Therefore,
Φsp(p
(κ+1)) ≥ Φ(κ)sp (p(κ+1)) > Φ(κ)sp (p(κ)) = Φsp(p(κ)),
(12)
i.e. p(κ+1) is better than p(κ); as such {p(κ)} is a sequence
of improved points that converges at least to a locally optimal
solution of (4) satisfying the first order necessary optimality
condition [28, Prop. 1]. In summary, we propose in Algorithm
1 a path-following computational procedure for the maximin
secrecy throughput optimization problem (4).
Algorithm 1 Path-following algorithm for maximin secrecy
throughput optimization
Initialization: Set κ = 0. Choose an initial feasible point
p(0) for the convex constraints (4b). Calculate R(0)min as the
value of the objective in (4) at p(0).
repeat
• Set κ = κ+ 1.
• Solve the convex optimization problem (11) to obtain
the solution p(κ).
• Calculate R(κ)min as the value of the objective in (4) at
p(κ).
until R
(κ)
min−R(κ−1)min )
R
(κ−1)
min
≤ tol.
B. Secure energy efficient maximization
Define
pi(p) = ζ
M∑
i=1
pi + Pc.
Applying the inequality (73) in Appendix II for x = 1/hiipi,
y =
∑M
j 6=i hjipj + σ
2
i , t = pi(p), and x¯ = 1/hiip
(κ)
i , y¯ =∑M
j 6=i hjip
(κ)
j + σ
2
i , t¯ = pi(p
(κ)) yields
fi(p)
pi(p)
≥ F (κ)i (p) (13)
for
F
(κ)
i (p) ,
2 ln(1 + x
(κ)
i )
pi(p(κ))
+
x
(κ)
i
pi(p(κ))(1 + x
(κ)
i )
×
(
2− p
(κ)
i
pi
−
∑
j 6=i hjipj + σ
2
i∑M
j 6=i hjip
(κ)
j + σ
2
i
)
− ln(1 + x
(κ)
i )
pi2(p(κ))
pi(p). (14)
On the other hand, applying inequality (75) in Appendix II for
α = 1 + ln(2), x = hiepi/(
∑
j 6=i hjepj + σ
2
e), t = pi(p) and
x¯ , hiep(κ)i /(
∑
j 6=i hjep
(κ)
j + σ
2
e), t¯ = pi(p
(κ)) yields
−gi(p)
pi(p)
≥ 2α− ln(1 + x
(κ)
e,i )
pi(p(κ))
+
x
(κ)
e,i
(1 + x
(κ)
e,i )pi(p
(κ))
− 1
(1 + x
(κ)
e,i )pi(p
(κ))
hiepi∑
j 6=i hjepj + σ2e
−α− ln(1 + x
(κ)
e,i )
pi2(p(κ))
pi(p)− α
pi(p)
, (15)
which together with (76) in Appendix II yield
fi(p)− gi(p)
pi(p)
≥ G(κ)i (p) (16)
4for the concave function
G
(κ)
i (p) , 2
α− ln(1 + x(κ)e,i )
pi(p(κ))
+
x
(κ)
e,i
(1 + x
(κ)
e,i )pi(p
(κ))
− 1
(1 + x
(κ)
e,i )pi(p
(κ))
0.5hie(p
2
i /p
(κ)
i + p
(κ)
i )∑
j 6=i hjepj + σ2e
−α− ln(1 + x
(κ)
e,i )
pi2(p(κ))
pi(p)− α
pi(p)
. (17)
Initialized by a feasible point p(0) for (5), we solve the
following convex optimization problem at the κ-th iteration
to generate the next iterative point p(κ+1):
max
p
Φ(κ)ee (p) ,
M∑
i=1
[F
(κ)
i (p) +G
(κ)
i (p)] s.t. (4b), (18a)
f
(κ)
i (p)− g(κ)i (p) ≥ ci, i = 1, . . . ,M. (18b)
The computational complexity of (18) is O(M2(2M)2.5 +
(2M)3.5).
Due to (7) and (9), the nonconvex constraint (5b) in (5) is
implied by the convex constraint (18b) in (18). Similarly to
(12), we can show that Φee(p(κ+1)) > Φee(p(κ)) whenever
p(κ+1) 6= p(κ); as such the computational procedure that
invokes the convex program (18) to generate the next iterative
point, is path-following for (5), which at least converges to
its locally optimal solution satisfying the Karush-Kuh-Tucker
(KKT) conditions of optimality.
Recalling the definition (9) and (10) of functions f (κ)i and g
(κ)
i ,
initialized by any feasible point p˜0) for the convex constraint
(4b), we generate p˜(κ+1), κ = 0, . . . , as the optimal solution
of the convex optimization problem
max
p
min
i=1,...,M
f
(κ)
i (p)− g(κ)i (p)
ci
s.t. (4b) (19)
until p˜(κ+1) such that mini=1,...,M (fi(p(κ+1)) −
gi(p
(κ+1))/ci ≥ 1 is found and thus p(0) = p˜(κ+1) is
feasible for (5) that is needed for the initial step.
Analogously, to address the maximin secure energy efficient
optimization problem (6) define
pii(pi) = ζpi + P
i
c .
Similarly to (13) and (16) the following inequalities can be
obtained:
fi(p)
pii(pi)
≥ F˜ (κ)i (pi) (20)
−gi(p)
pii(pi)
≥ G˜(κ)i (pi) (21)
for
F˜
(κ)
i (pi) ,
2 ln(1 + x
(κ)
i )
pii(p
(κ)
i )
+
x
(κ)
i
pii(p
(κ)
i )(1 + x
(κ)
i )
×
(
2− p
(κ)
i
pi
−
∑
j 6=i hjipj + σ
2
i∑M
j 6=i hjip
(κ)
j + σ
2
i
)
− ln(1 + x
(κ)
i )
pi2i (p
(κ)
i )
pii(pi) (22)
G˜
(κ)
i (pi) , 2
α− ln(1 + x(κ)e,i )
pii(p
(κ)
i )
+
x
(κ)
e,i
(1 + x
(κ)
e,i )pii(p
(κ)
i )
− 1
(1 + x
(κ)
e,i )pii(p
(κ)
i )
0.5hie(p
2
i /p
(κ)
i + p
(κ)
i )∑
j 6=i hjepj + σ2e
−α− ln(1 + x
(κ)
e,i )
pi2i (p
(κ)
i )
pii(pi)− α
pii(pi)
. (23)
Initialized a feasible point p(0) for (6), which is found by
using the generation (19), the following convex optimization
problem at the κ-th iteration is proposed to generate the next
iterative point p(κ+1):
max
p
min
i=1,...,M
[F˜
(κ)
i (p) + G˜
(κ)
i (p)]
s.t. (4b), f (κ)i (p)− g(κ)i (p) ≥ ci, i = 1, . . . ,M. (24)
The computational complexity of (24) is similar to that of (18).
The computational procedure that invokes the convex pro-
gram (24) to generate the next iterative point, is path-following
for (6), which at least converges to its locally optimal solution
satisfying the first order necessary optimality condition.
III. INTERFERENCE NETWORKS UNDER PARTIAL WIRETAP
CSI
When the EV is not part of the legitimate network, it is
almost impossible to estimate channels hie from the transmit-
ters to it. It is common to assume that hie=h¯ieχie, where χie
is an exponential distribution with the unit mean and h¯ie is a
known deterministic quantity. Accordingly, instead of (2), the
wiretapped throughput for user i at the EV is defined via the
following throughput outage [29]–[33]:
gi,o(p) , max {ln(1 + ri) :
Prob
(
hiepi∑
j 6=i hjepj + σ2e
< ri
)
≤ EV } (25)
for EV > 0. Using (63) in Appendix I, it follows that
gi,o(p) = ln(1 + ri)
where
pih¯ie ln(1−EV )+riσ2epi+h¯ie
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
rih¯jepj
h¯iepi
)
= 0,
i = 1, ...,M. (26)
5Therefore, the problem of maximin secrecy throughput opti-
mization can be formulated as
max
p,r
min
i=1,...,M
[fi(p)− ln(1 + ri)] s.t (4b), (26), (27a)
ri > 0, i = 1, ...,M. (27b)
The following result unravels the computationally intractable
nonlinear equality constraints in (26).
Proposition 1: The problem (27) is equivalent to the fol-
lowing problem
max
p,r
min
i=1,...,M
[fi(p)− ln(1 + ri)] s.t (4b), (27b), (28a)
pih¯ie ln(1− EV ) + riσ2e + pih¯ie
×
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
rih¯jepj
h¯iepi
)
≥ 0, i = 1, ...,M. (28b)
Proof: Since the equality constraint (26) implies the inequality
constraint (28b), it is true that
the optimal value of (27) ≤ the optimal value of (28).
We now show that there is an optimal solution of (28) satisfies
the equality constraint (26) and thus
the optimal value of (28) ≤ the optimal value of (27),
showing the equivalence between (28) and (27). Indeed, sup-
pose that at the optimality,
pih¯ie ln(1− EV ) + riσ2e + pih¯ie
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
rih¯jepj
h¯iepi
)
> 0
for some i = 1, . . . ,M . Then there is 0 < γi < 1 such that
pih¯ie ln(1− EV ) + (γri)σ2e + pih¯ie
×
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
γrih¯jepj
h¯iepi
)
= 0,
that yields
fi(p)− ln(1 + γri) > fi(p)− ln(1 + ri),
so γiri is also the optimal solution of (28), which satisfies the
equality constraint (26). 
To address problem (28), note that a lower bounding func-
tion for the first term in (28a) is f (κ)i (p) defined by (8), while
an upper bounding function for the second term in (28a) is
the following linear function
a
(κ)
i (ri) = ln(1 + r
(κ)
i )−
r
(κ)
i
r
(κ)
i + 1
+
ri
r
(κ)
i + 1
. (29)
The main difficulty now is to develop a lower bounding
approximation for the function in the left hand side (LHS)
of constraint (28b). Applying inequality (72) in Appendix
II for x = 1/rih¯jepj , y = h¯iepi and x¯ = 1/r
(κ)
i h¯jep
(κ)
j ,
y¯ = h¯iep
(κ)
i yields
ln
(
1 +
rih¯jepj
h¯iepi
)
≥ λ(κ)ij (ri, pj , pi) (30)
for
λ
(κ)
ij (ri, pj , pi) , ln(1 + x
(κ)
ij ) + y
(κ)
ij
×
(
2− r
(κ)
i p
(κ)
j
ripj
− pi
p
(κ)
i
)
(31)
with x(κ)ij , r
(κ)
i h¯jep
(κ)
j /h¯iep
(κ)
i and y
(κ)
ij , x
(κ)
ij /(x
(κ)
ij + 1).
Therefore, over the trust region
λ
(κ)
ij (ri, pj , pi) ≥ 0,
2.5− ri
r
(κ)
i
− pj
p
(κ)
j
≥ 0 (32)
it is true that
pi ln(1 +
rih¯jepj
h¯iepi
) ≥
pi ln(1 + x
(κ)
ij ) + y
(κ)
ij
(
2pi −
r
(κ)
i p
(κ)
j pi
ripj
− p
2
i
p
(κ)
i
)
=
(
ln(1 + x
(κ)
ij ) + 2y
(κ)
ij
)
pi − 0.5y(κ)ij
[
2
p2i
p
(κ)
i
+(
√
2pi√
p
(κ)
i
+
√
p
(κ)
i r
(κ)
i p
(κ)
j√
2ripj
)2 − 2p
2
i
p
(κ)
i
−p
(κ)
i (r
(κ)
i p
(κ)
j )
2
2r2ip
2
j
]
≥
Λ
(κ)
i (ri,pj ,pi) (33)
for
Λ
(κ)
i (ri,pj ,pi) =
(
ln(1 + x
(κ)
ij ) + 2y
(κ)
ij
)
pi
−0.5y(κ)i
(
√
2pi√
p
(κ)
i
+
√
p
(κ)
i r
(κ)
i p
(κ)
j√
2ripj
)2
−0.5y(κ)i p(κ)i
(
ri
r
(κ)
i
+
pj
p
(κ)
j
− 2.5
)
.
Note that in obtaining (33) we also used the fact that func-
tion ν(ri,pj) , 1/r2ip2j is convex in the domain {ri >
0,pj > 0} and accordingly [25] 1/r2ip2j ≥ ν(r(κ)i , p(κ)j ) +
〈∇ν(r(κ)i , p(κ)j ), (ri,pj) − (r(κ)i , p(κ)j )〉 = [5 − 2(ri/r(κ)i +
pj/p
(κ)
j )]/(r
(κ)
i p
(κ)
j )
2.
Initialized from a feasible point (p(0), r(0)) for (28) we solve
the following convex program at the κ-th iteration to generate
(p(κ+1), r
(κ+1)
u ):
max
p,r
min
i=1,...,M
[f
(κ)
i (p)− a(κ)i (ri)] s.t (4b), (27b), (32), (34a)
pih¯ie ln(1− EV ) + σ2eri + h¯ie
M∑
j 6=i
Λ
(κ)
ij (ri, pj , pi) ≥ 0,(34b)
i = 1, ...,M.
The computational complexity of (34) is O((2M)2(5M)2.5 +
(5M)2.5) because it involves 2M decision variables and 5M
linear and quadratic constraints.
6Then r(κ+1)i is found from solving
0 = ψi(ri) , p(κ+1)i h¯ie ln(1− EV ) + riσ2e
+p
(κ+1)
i h¯ie
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
rih¯jep
(κ+1)
j
h¯iep
(κ+1)
i
)
, (35)
i = 1, ...,M,
by bisection on [0, r(κ+1)u,i ] such that
0 ≤ ψi(r(κ+1)i ) ≤ b (tolerance). (36)
A bisection on [rl, ru] for solving ψi(ri) = 0 where ψi
increases in ri > 0 is implemented as follows:
• Define ri = (rl + ru)/2. Reset rl = ri if ψi(ri) < 0.
Otherwise reset ru = ri.
• Terminate until 0 ≤ ψi(ri) ≤ b.
In summary, we propose in Algorithm 2 a path-following
computational procedure for the maximin secrecy throughput
optimization problem (28), which at least converges to its
locally optimal solution satisfying the first order necessary
optimality condition.
Algorithm 2 Path-following algorithm for maximin secrecy
throughput optimization
Initialization: Set κ = 0. Choose an initial feasible point
(p(0), r(0)) for (28) and calculate R(0)min as the value of the
objective function in (28) at (p(0), r(0)).
repeat
• Set κ = κ+ 1.
• Solve the convex optimization problem (34) to obtain
the solution (p(κ), r(κ)u ).
• Solve the nonlinear equations (35) to obtain the roots
r
(κ)
i .
• Calculate R(κ)min as the value of the objective function
in (28) at (p(κ), r(κ)).
until R
(κ)
min−R(κ−1)min )
R
(κ−1)
min
≤ tol.
A feasible (p(0), r(0)) is found as follows: taking p(0)
feasible to the power constraint (4b) and finding r(0) from
solving
0 = ψi(ri) , p(0)i h¯ie ln(1− EV ) + riσ2e
+h¯iep
(0)
i
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
rih¯jep
(0)
j
h¯iep
(0)
i
)
i = 1, ...,M,
by bisection on [0, r(0)u,i ] with ψi(ru,i) > 0. Such r
(0)
u,i can be
easily found: from any ru,i > 0, if ψi(ru,i) ≥ 0 then we are
done. Otherwise reset ru,i ← 2ru,i and check ψi(ru,i). Stop
when ψ(ru,i) > 0. Intuitively, taking r
(0)
u,i = h¯iep
(0)
i /σ
2
e will
work.
Furthermore, the problem of SEE maximization can be
formulated as
max
p,r
∑M
i=1 (fi(p)− ln(1 + ri))
pi(p)
s.t (4b), (27b), (28b) (37a)
fi(p)− ln(1 + ri) ≥ ci, i = 1, . . . ,M. (37b)
Using the inequality (74) in Appendix II leads to
− ln(1 + ri)
pi(p)
≥ a˜(κ)i (ri,p)
for
a˜
(κ)
i (ri,p) , 2
α− ln(1 + r(κ)i )
pi(p(κ))
+
r
(κ)
i
pi(p(κ))(1 + r
(κ)
i )
− ri
pi(p(κ))(1 + r
(κ)
i )
−α− ln(1 + r
(κ)
i )
pi2(p(κ))
pi(p)− α
pi(p)
. (38)
Initialized by a feasible (p(0), r(0)), the following convex pro-
gramm is solved to generate (p(κ+1), r(κ+1)) at the κiteration:
max
p,r
M∑
i=1
[F
(κ)
i (p) + a˜
(κ)
i (ri,p)] (39a)
s.t (4b), (27b), (32), (34b), (39b)
f
(κ)
i (p)− a(κ)i (ri) ≥ ci, i = 1, . . . ,M. (39c)
The computational complexity of (34) is O((2M)2(6M)2.5 +
(6M)2.5).
It can be shown that the computational procedure that
invokes the convex program (39) to generate the next iterative
point, is path-following for (37), which at least converges to
its locally optimal solution satisfying the KKT conditions.
A point (p(0), r(0)) is feasible for (37) if and only if
mini=1,...,M [fi(p
(0)) − ln(1 + r(0)i )]/ci ≥ 1 and thus can be
easily located by adapting Algorithm 2.
Similarly, a path-following procedure for the following
maximin SEE optimization problem can be proposed
max
p,r
min
i=1,...,M
fi(p)− ln(1 + ri)
pii(p)
(40a)
s.t (4b), (27b), (28b), (37b). (40b)
IV. ROBUST OPTIMIZATION
Beside assuming that hie=h¯ieχie with an exponential distri-
bution χie with the unit mean and deterministic hie, we also
assume that CSI of hji is not known perfectly in the form
hji = h¯ji(1 + δχji) with deterministic h¯ji and δ, and random
χji, which is an independent exponential distribution of the
unit mean. Instead of (1), the throughput at user i is defined
via the following outage probability
fi,o(p) , max{ln(1 + Ri) :
Prob
(
hiipi∑M
j 6=i hjipj + σ
2
i
< Ri
)
≤ c} (41)
for 0 < c << 1.
Using (67) in Appendix II, it follows that
fi,o(p) = ln(1 + Ri), i = 1, . . . ,M, (42)
7where
pih¯ii[δ ln(1− c)− 1] + Ri(σ2i +
∑
j 6=i
h¯jipj)
+δh¯iipi
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
h¯jiRipj
h¯iipi
)
= 0, i = 1, . . . ,M. (43)
Therefore, the problem of maximin secrecy throughput robust
optimization is defined by
max
p,R,r
min
i=1,...,M
[ln(1 + Ri)− ln(1 + ri)] (44a)
s.t (4b), (27b), (28b), (43), (44b)
Ri > 0, i = 1, ...,M. (44c)
The following result unravels the computationally intractable
nonlinear equality constraints in (43):
Proposition 2: Problem (44) is equivalent to the following
problem
max
p,R,r
min
i=1,...,M
[ln(1 + Ri)− ln(1 + ri)] (45a)
s.t (4b), (28b), (27b), (44c) (45b)
pih¯ii[δ ln(1− c)− 1] + Ri(σ2i +
∑
j 6=i
h¯jipj)
+δh¯iipi
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
h¯jiRipj
h¯iipi
)
≤ 0, (45c)
i = 1, ...,M.
Proof: Again, it is obvious that the optimal value of (44) is
not more than the optimal value of (45). Furthermore, at an
optimal solution of (45), if
pih¯ii[δ ln(1− c)− 1] + Ri(σ2i +
∑
j 6=i
h¯jipj)
+ δh¯iipi
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
h¯jiRipj
h¯iipi
)
< 0,
for some i then there is γ > 1 such that
pih¯ii[δ ln(1− c)− 1] + (γRi)(σ2i +
∑
j 6=i
h¯jipj)
+ δh¯iipi
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
h¯ji(γRi)pj
h¯iipi
)
= 0,
which results in ln(1 + γRi) > ln(1 + Ri), implying that
γRi is also an optimal solution of (45). We thus have proved
that there is always an optimal solution of (45) to satisfy the
equality constraints in (43), so the optimal value of (45) is not
more than the optimal value of (44), completing the proof of
Proposition 2. 
To address problem (45), firstly we provide a lower bound-
ing approximation for the first term in the objective function
in (45b) as follows
ln(1 + Ri) ≥ A(κ)i (Ri)
, ln(1 +R(κ)i ) +
R
(κ)
i
R
(κ)
i + 1
− (R
(κ)
i )
2
R
(κ)
i + 1
1
Ri
.
Next, to obtain an upper bounding approximation for the
function in the left hand side of (45c) and thus to provide an
inner approximation for constraint (45c), we use the following
inequality
Ripj = 0.5(Ri + pj)
2 − 0.5R2i − 0.5p2j
≤ Υ(κ)ij (Ri, pj)
, 0.5(Ri + pj)2 −R(κ)i Ri + 0.5(R(κ)i )2
−p(κ)j pj + 0.5(p(κ)j )2, (46)
over the trust region
2Ri ≥ R(κ)i , 2pj ≥ p(κ)j . (47)
Then
pi ln
(
1 +
h¯jiRipj
h¯iipi
)
≤
pi
[
ln
(
1 +
h¯jiR
(κ)
i p
(κ)
j
h¯iip
(κ)
i
)
+
1
h¯ii
h¯ji
+
R
(κ)
i p
(κ)
j
p
(κ)
i
(
Ripj
pi
− R
(κ)
i p
(κ)
j
p
(κ)
i
)
 ≤
Φ
(κ)
ij (Ri, pj , pi) ,
pi ln
(
1 +
h¯jiR
(κ)
i p
(κ)
j
h¯iip
(κ)
i
)
+
1
h¯ii
h¯ji
+
R
(κ)
i p
(κ)
j
p
(κ)
i
(
Υ
(κ)
ij (Ri, pj)−
R
(κ)
i p
(κ)
j
p
(κ)
i
pi
)
. (48)
Initialized from a feasible (p(0), R(0), r(0)) for (45) we solve
the following convex program at the κ-th iteration to generate
the next iterative point (p(κ+1), R(κ+1)l , r
(κ+1)
u ):
max
w,r
min
i=1,...,M
[A
(κ)
i (Ri)− a(κ)i (ri)] (49a)
s.t (4b), (27b), (32), (34b), (44c), (47) (49b)
pih¯ii [δ ln(1− c)− 1] + σ2iRi +
∑
j 6=i
h¯jiΥ
(κ)
ij (Ri,pj)
+δh¯ii
∑M
j 6=i Φ
(κ)
ij (Ri, pj , pi) ≤ 0, (49c)
i = 1, ...,M.
The computational complexity of (49) is O((3M)2(9M)2.5 +
(9M)2.5).
At the same κ-th iteration, r(κ+1)i is found from solving
(35) by bisection on [0, r(κ+1)u,i ] such that (36), while R
(κ+1)
i
is found from solving
ζi(Ri) = 0, i = 1, . . . ,M, (50)
for the increasing function
ζi(Ri) , δ ln(1− c)− 1 +
Ri(σ
2
i +
∑
j 6=i h¯jip
(κ+1)
j )
h¯iip
(κ+1)
i
+ δ
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
h¯jiRip
(κ+1)
j
h¯iip
(κ+1)
i
)
,
8by bisection on [R(κ+1)l,i , Ru,i] with ζi(Ru,i) > 0 such that
−b ≤ gi(R(κ+1)i ) ≤ 0. (51)
Ru,i can be easily located: initialized by Ri = 2R
(κ+1)
l,i and
check ζi(Ri). If ζi(Ri) > 0 then we are done. Otherwise
reset Ri ← 2Ri until ζi(Ri) > 0. Intuitively, taking Ru,i =
2h¯iip
(κ+1)
i /(σ
2
i +
∑
j 6=i h¯jip
(κ+1)
j ) will work.
In summary, we propose in Algorithm 3 a path-following
computational procedure for the maximin secrecy throughput
optimization problem (45), which at least converges to its
locally optimal solution satisfying the first order necessary
optimality condition.
Algorithm 3 Path-following algorithm for maximin secrecy
throughput optimization
Initialization: Set κ = 0. Choose an initial feasible point
(p(0), R(0), r(0)) for (45) and calculate R(0)min as the value
of the objective function in (45) at (p(0), R(0), r(0)).
repeat
• Set κ = κ+ 1.
• Solve the convex optimization problem (49) to obtain
the solution (p(κ), R(κ)l , r
(κ)
u ).
• Solve the nonlinear equations (35) to obtain the roots
r
(κ)
i .
• Solve the nonlinear equations (50) to obtain the roots
R
(κ)
i .
• Calculate R(κ)min as the value of the objective function
in (45) at (p(κ), R(κ), r(κ)).
until R
(κ)
min−R(κ−1)min )
R
(κ−1)
min
≤ tol.
An initial feasible (p(0), R(0), r(0)) can be easily found as
follows: taking any p(0) feasible to the power constraint (4b)
to find R(0) and r(0) from solving
ζi(Ri) , δ ln(1− c)− 1 +
Ri(σ
2
i +
∑
j 6=i h¯jip
(0)
j )
h¯iip
(0)
i
+ δ
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
h¯jiRip
(0)
j
h¯iip
(0)
i
)
= 0, i = 1, ...,M,
by bisection on [0, 2h¯iip
(0)
i /(σ
2
i +
∑
j 6=i h¯jip
(0)
j )], and r
(0) is
found from solving
ln(1− c) + riσ
2
e
h¯iep
(0)
i
+
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
rih¯jep
(0)
j
h¯iep
(0)
i
)
= 0,
i = 1, ...,M,
by bisection on [0, h¯iep
(0)
i /σ
2
e ].
Lastly, the network secure energy efficiency problem is now
formulated by
max
p,R,r
∑M
i=1(ln(1 + Ri)− ln(1 + ri))
pi(p)
(52a)
s.t (4b), (27b), (28b), (43), (44c), (52b)
ln(1 + Ri)− ln(1 + ri) ≥ ci, (52c)
i = 1, . . . ,M. (52d)
To this end, we use inequality (73) in Appendix II to obtain
ln(1 + Ri)
pi(p)
≥ A˜(κ)i (Ri,p)
, 2 ln(1 +R
(κ)
i )
pi(p(κ))
+
R
(κ)
i
pi(p(κ))(1 +R
(κ)
i )
×
(
1− R
(κ)
i
Ri
)
− ln(1 +R
(κ)
i )
pi2(p(κ))
pi(p) (53)
Initialized by a feasible point (R(0), r(0), p(0)), at the κ-
th iteration, the following convex programm is solved to
generated (R(κ+1), r(κ+1), p(κ1))
max
w,r
M∑
i=1
[
A˜
(κ)
i (Ri,p) + a˜
(κ)
i (ri,p)
]
(54a)
s.t (4b), (27b), (32), (34b), (44c), (47), (49c),(54b)
A
(κ)
i (Ri)− a(κ)i (ri) ≥ ci, i = 1, ...,M. (54c)
The computational complexity of (49) is O((3M)2(10M)2.5+
(10M)2.5).
It can be shown that the computational procedure that
invokes the convex program (54) to generate the next iterative
point, is path-following for (52), which at least converges to
its locally optimal solution satisfying the KKT conditions.
A point (p(0), R(0), r(0)) is feasible for (52) if and only if
mini=1,...,M [fi(R
(0)
i )− ln(1 + r(0)i )]/ci ≥ 1 and thus can be
easily located by adapting Algorithm 3.
Similarly, a path-following procedure for the following
maximin SEE optimization problem can be proposed
max
p,r
min
i=1,...,M
fi(Ri)− ln(1 + ri)
pii(p)
s.t. (4b), (27b), (28b), (43), (44c), (52c).
(55)
V. SIMULATION
This section evaluates the performance of the proposed al-
gorithms through extensive simulation. Considered in all simu-
lation studies is a wireless network with M = 10 transmitter-
user communication pairs and noise variance σ2i = σ
2
e = 1
mW [34]. All channels among each pair are i.i.d. complex
normal random variable with zero mean and unit variance. The
drain efficiency of power amplifier 1/ζ is set to be 40% and
the circuit power of each transmitter is P ic = 5 mW. Besides,
we set c = 0.1 and EV ∈ {0.1, 0.6} and δ = 0.1. The
computation tolerance for terminating all proposed Algorithms
is tol = 10−4. We divide the obtained information throughput
results by ln(2) to arrive at the unit of bps/Hz (in throughput)
and bits/J/Hz (in energy efficiency).
A. Maximin secrecy throughput optimization
This subsection analyzes the secrecy throughput in the pres-
ence of eavesdropper. In what follows, we consider five cases,
including “Perfect CSI”, “Partial CSI (EV = 0.1)”, “Partial
CSI (EV = 0.6)”, “Robust Opt. (EV = 0.1 c = 0.1)” and
“Robust Opt. (EV = 0.6 c = 0.1)”. The terms “Perfect CSI”,
“Partial CSI” and “Robust Opt.” correspond to the scenarios
discussed in Sections III, IV and V, respectively. Fig. 2 plots
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Fig. 2. Min secrecy throughput among users versus the transmit power budget
TABLE I
AVERAGE NUMBER OF ITERATIONS FOR MAXIMIN SECRECY THROUGHPUT
OPTIMIZATION.
Pi (mW) 10 20 30 40 50
Perfect CSI 8.12 7.63 7.61 7.71 8.56
Partial CSI (EV = 0.1) 11.25 10.87 10.73 10.40 10.31
Partial CSI (EV = 0.6) 13.12 12.18 14.92 12.60 11.68
Robust Opt. (EV = 0.1) 4.20 4.33 4.20 3.52 3.35
Robust Opt. (EV = 0.6) 5.18 4.96 4.82 4.14 4.90
the minimum secrecy throughput versus the transmit power
budget Pi varying from 10 to 50 mW. As expected, it is seen
that the secrecy throughput increase with the transmitted power
budget Pi. It is also observed that the secrecy throughput
of “Partial CSI” with EV = 0.1 is always better than
the secrecy throughputs of others. For EV = 0.1, “Partial
CSI” and “Robust Opt.” clearly and significantly outperform
“Perfect CSI”. However, the secrecy throughput of “Perfect
CSI” is superior to the secrecy throughputs of “Partial CSI”
and “Robust Opt.” with EV = 0.6. This is not a surprise
because according to the wiretapped throughput defined by (2)
and the throughput outage defined by (25)-(26), the former is
seen higher than the later for small EV .
Table I provides the average number of iterations required to
solve maximin secrecy throughput optimization for the above
three cases. As can be observed, our proposed algorithm con-
verges in less than 14 iterations, on average, for all considered
cases.
B. Energy efficiency maximization
In this subsection, we first examine the performance of EE
maximization algorithm versus the QoS constraint. The trans-
mitted power Pi is fixed at 20 mW and QoS constraint ci varies
from 0.1 to 0.5 bps/Hz. It can be observed from Fig. 3 that the
EE performance degrades as the QoS constraint ci increases.
Moreover, “Partial CSI” with EV = 0.1 outperforms others
in terms of EE performance. To find out the impact on the sum
throughput and total power consumption in EE maximization
algorithm, the achieved sum throughput and the total power
consumed are illustrated in Fig. 4 and 5, respectively. It can
be seen that the total power consumption increases faster
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TABLE II
AVERAGE NUMBER OF ITERATIONS FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY
MAXIMIZATION.
ci (bps/Hz) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Perfect CSI 32.21 29.62 24.26 21.23 15.33
Partial CSI (EV = 0.1) 33.73 33.12 28.75 25.74 23.25
Partial CSI (EV = 0.6) 35.82 30.56 34.22 22.26 18.34
Robust Opt. (EV = 0.1) 24.25 27.41 25.53 30.06 31.75
Robust Opt. (EV = 0.6) 29.02 23.76 26.80 29.32 23.46
than the sum throughput, which explains why EE degrades
as ci increases in Fig. 3. Although the sum throughput of
“Robust Opt.” is slightly better than “Partial CSI”, “Partial
CSI” consumes less power than “Robust Opt.”. Table II shows
that our proposed EE maximization algorithm converges in
less than 35 iterations, on average, in all considered cases.
Next, we further investigate the performance of EE versus
the transmit power budget. The QoS constraint ci is fixed at
0.4 bps/Hz and Pi varies from 10 to 50 mW. As shown in Fig.
6, we observe that the EE performance of “Partial CSI” with
EV = 0.1 clearly and significantly outperforms the optimized
EE of other cases. Furthermore, it can be seen that the EE
performances saturate when the transmit power budget exceeds
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Fig. 8. Total power consumption versus the transmit power budget
the threshold. That is because for small transmit power budget,
the denominator of EE is dominated by the circuit power and
the EE is maximized by maximization of the sum throughput
in the numerator. However, for larger transmit power budget,
the denominator of EE is dominated by the actual transmit
power. When the total power consumption saturates in Fig. 8,
both the EE and the sum throughput accordingly saturate in
Figs. 6 and 7.
C. Maxmin energy efficiency optimization
In this subsection, we aim to maximize the minimum EE
performance. Firstly, Fig. 9 plots the maximized minimum EE
versus QoS constraint. The transmitted power Pi is fixed at
20 mW and QoS constraint ci varies from 0.1 to 0.5 bps/Hz.
It can be seen that the optimized minimum EE decreases with
increasing ci and the EE performance of “Partial CSI” with
EV = 0.1 is always better than the optimized EE of other
cases. Furthermore, it is also observed that for EV = 0.1
“Partial CSI” and “Robust Opt.” outperform “Perfect CSI” in
terms of EE performance, while “Perfect CSI” is superior
to “Partial CSI” and “Robust Opt.” for EV = 0.6. The
corresponding throughput and power consumption are plotted
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Fig. 9. Minimum energy efficiency versus the QoS constraint
in Fig. 10 and 11, respectively. Table III shows that maximin
EE optimization converges in less than 33 iterations, on
average, in all considered cases.
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Fig. 10. Throughput versus the QoS constraint
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Fig. 11. Power consumption versus the QoS constraint
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Fig. 13. Throughput versus the transmit power budget
10 20 30 40 50
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Pi (mW)
Po
w
er
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
(m
W
)
 
 
Perfect CSI
Partial CSI (ε
EV=0.1)
Partial CSI (ε
EV=0.6)
Robust Opt.(ε
EV=0.1)
Robust Opt.(ε
EV=0.6)
Fig. 14. Power consumption versus the transmit power budget
TABLE III
AVERAGE NUMBER OF ITERATIONS FOR MAXIMIN ENERGY EFFICIENCY
OPTIMIZATION.
ci (bps/Hz) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Perfect CSI 32.42 30.35 31.61 29.23 22.25
Partial CSI (EV = 0.1) 21.86 22.13 20.42 20.82 30.23
Partial CSI (EV = 0.6) 23.66 25.02 22.68 33.30 29.34
Robust Opt. (EV = 0.1) 16.05 23.27 23.36 31.15 18.62
Robust Opt. (EV = 0.6) 20.78 26.12 31.24 27.46 23.92
Next, we investigate the maximin EE performance versus
the transmit power budget. The QoS constraint ci is fixed at
0.4 bps/Hz and Pi varies from 10 to 50 mW. The minimum
EE performance versus the transmit power budget is illustrated
in Fig. 12. Again, we observe that the optimized minimum
EE saturates when the transmit power is larger than some
threshold. This is due to the fact that under small transmit
power regime, the EE is maximized by maximizing the
throughput in the numerator. When the transmit power is large
enough to obtain the optimized EE, both throughput and power
consumption accordingly saturate in Figs. 13 and 14.
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Fig. 12. Minimum energy efficiency versus the transmit power budget
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered the problem of power allocation to
maximize the worst links’s secrecy throughput or the network’s
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secure energy efficiency under various scenarios of available
channel state information. We have further proposed path-
following algorithms tailored for each of the considered sce-
narios. Finally, we have provided simulations to show the effi-
ciency of the proposed algorithms. Extensions to beamforming
in multi-input single-output (MISO) interference networks
with multiple eavesdroppers are under current investigation.
APPENDIX I: OUTAGE PROBABILITY FUNDAMENTAL
Recall a probability distribution χ is called an exponential
distribution if its probability density function (pdf) is in form
λe−λx with λ > 0. It is immediate to check that Prob(χ ≥
t) = e−λt and E[χ] = 1/λ. Recall the following result [29,
(15)].
Theorem 1: Suppose z1, · · · , zn are independent exponen-
tially distributed random variables with E(zi) = 1/λi. Then
for deterministic pi > 0, i = 1, · · · , n:
Prob(p1z1 ≤
n∑
i=2
pizi) = 1−
n∏
i=2
1
1 + (λ1/p1)/(λi/pi)
. (56)
It follows from (56) that
Prob(p1z1 > c+
n∑
i=2
pizi) =
e−λ1c/p1
n∏
i=2
1
1 + (λ1/p1)/(λi/pi)
(57)
and
Prob(
p1z1
n∑
i=2
pizi + σ
> γ) =
Prob(p1z1 >
n∑
i=2
γpizi + γσ) =
e−λ1γσ/p1
n∏
i=2
1
1 + γ(λ1/p1)/(λi/pi)
. (58)
Sometimes, it is also more convenient to write (56), (57) and
(58) in terms of means λ¯i = 1/λi of zi as
Prob(p1z1 ≤
n∑
i=2
pizi) = 1−
n∏
i=2
p1λ¯1
p1λ¯1 + piλi
, (59)
Prob(p1z1 > c+
n∑
i=2
pizi) = e
−c/p1λ¯1
n∏
i=2
p1λ¯1
p1λ¯1 + piλ¯i
, (60)
Prob(
p1z1∑n
i=2 pizi + σ
> γ) = e−γσ/p1λ¯1
n∏
i=2
p1λ¯1
p1λ¯1 + γpiλ¯i
(61)
Theorem 2: For given ε > 0, define
rmax , max{r : Prob( p1z1∑n
i=2 pizi + σ
2
) < r) ≤ ε} (62)
Then rmax is the unique positive root of the nonlinear equation
ln(1− ε) + rσ
2
p1λ¯1
+
n∑
i=2
ln(1 +
rpiλ¯i
p1λ¯1
) = 0. (63)
Proof: Applying (60) yields
Prob(
p1z1∑n
i=2 pizi + σ
2
< r) =
Prob(p1z1 < r(
n∑
i=2
pizi + σ
2)) =
1− e−rσ2/p1λ¯1
n∏
i=2
p1λ¯1
p1λ¯1 + rpiλ¯i
. (64)
Therefore,
Prob(
p1z1∑n
i=2 pizi + σ
2
) < r) ≤ ε
⇔ 1− e−rσ2/p1λ¯1
n∏
i=2
p1λ¯1
p1λ¯1 + rpiλ¯i
≤ ε
⇔ ln(1− ε) + rσ
2
p1λ¯1
+
n∑
i=2
ln(1 +
rpiλ¯i
p1λ¯1
) ≤ 0. (65)
By noticing that the function in the left hand side (LHS) of
(65) is increasing in r, we arrive at (63). 
Theorem 3: Suppose z¯i > 0, pi > 0, δ > 0 and σ > 0
are deterministic values, while z˜i are independent exponential
distributions. For ε > 0, define
rp , max {r : Prob( p1z¯1(1 + δz˜1)∑n
i=2 piz¯i(1 + δz˜i) + σ
2
< r) ≤ ε}.
(66)
Then rp is the unique positive root of the nonlinear equation
δ ln(1− ε) + r(σ
2 +
∑n
i=2 piz¯i)− p1z¯1
z¯1p1
+ δ
n∑
i=2
ln(1 +
rz¯ipi
z¯1p1
) = 0. (67)
Proof: Using (65) yields
Prob(
p1z¯1(1 + δz˜1)∑n
i=2 piz¯i(1 + δz˜i) + σ
2
< r) ≤ ε
⇔ ln(1− ε) + r(σ
2 +
∑n
i=2 piz¯i)− p1z¯1
z¯1p1δ
+
n∑
i=2
ln(1 +
rz¯ipi
z¯1p1
) ≤ 0 (68)
⇔ δ ln(1− ε) + r(σ
2 +
∑n
i=2 piz¯i)− p1z¯1
z¯1p1
+δ
n∑
i=2
ln(1 +
rz¯ipi
z¯1p1
) ≤ 0. (69)
Again, by noticing that the function in the LHS of (69) is
increasing in r we arrive at (67). 
One can see that for δ → 0 (less uncertainty), (69) becomes
r(σ2 +
∑n
i=2 piz¯i)− p1z¯1
z¯1p1
≤ 0
⇔ r(σ2 +
n∑
i=2
piz¯i)− p1z¯1 ≤ 0
⇔ r ≤ p1z¯1
σ2 +
∑n
i=2 piz¯i
,
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so rp is the standard ratio
p1z¯1
σ2 +
∑n
i=2 piz¯i
.
APPENDIX II: FUNDAMENTAL INEQUALITIES
Lemma 1: It is true that
ln(1 + 1/t) ≥ 1/(t+ 1) ∀ t > 0 (70)
Proof: One can easily check (t+1) ln(1+1/t) ≥ 1 ∀ t > 0 by
plotting the graph of function (t+1) ln(1+1/t) over (0,+∞).

Theorem 4: The function f(x, y, t) , ln(1 + 1/xy)1/t is
convex in the domain {x > 0, y > 0, t > 0}.
Proof: Writing f(x, y, t) = (1/t)(ln(xy + 1) − lnx − ln y),
it is ease to see that the Hessian ∇2f(x, y, t) is
∇2f(x, y, t) =
2xy + 1
x2(xy + 1)2t
1
(xy + 1)2t
1
t2(xy + 1)x
1
(xy + 1)2t
2xy + 1
y2(xy + 1)2t
1
t2(xy + 1)y
1
t2(xy + 1)x
1
t2(xy + 1)y
2 ln(1 + 1/xy)
t3
 
(x2y2(xy + 1)2t3)−1
·
(xy + 1)y2t2 x2y2t2 t(xy + 1)xy2x2y2t2 (xy + 1)x2t2 t(xy + 1)x2y
t(xy + 1)xy2 t(xy + 1)x2y 2(xy + 1)x2y2
 , (71)
where the inequality (70) has been applied to the (3, 3)-th entry
of ∇2f(x, y, t) to arrive the matrix inequality in (71). Here
and after, A  B for matrices A and B means that A−B is a
positive definite matrix. Then, calculating the subdeterminants
of matrix in the right hand side (RHS) of (71) yields (xy +
1)y2t2 > 0,∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
x2(xy + 1)t
1
(xy + 1)2t
1
(xy + 1)2t
1
y2(xy + 1)t
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = x2y2t4(2xy + 1) > 0
and∣∣∣∣∣∣
(xy + 1)y2t2 x2y2t2 t(xy + 1)xy2
x2y2t2 (xy + 1)x2t2 t(xy + 1)x2y
t(xy + 1)xy2 t(xy + 1)x2y 2(xy + 1)x2y2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= x4y4t4(xy + 1)[(xy + 1)3 − 1] > 0.
Therefore the matrix in the RHS of (71) is positive definite, im-
plying that the Hessian ∇2f(x, y, t) is positive definite, which
is the necessary and sufficient condition for the convexity of
f [25]. 
As the function f(x, y) , ln(1 + 1/xy) is convex in the
domain {x > 0, y > 0} it follows that [25] for every x > 0,
y > 0, x¯ > 0 and y¯ > 0,
ln(1 + 1/xy) = f(x, y)
≥ f(x¯, y¯) + 〈∇f(x¯, y¯), (x, y)− (x¯, y¯)〉
= ln(1 + 1/x¯y¯)
+
1/x¯y¯
1 + 1/x¯y¯
(2− x/x¯− y/y¯). (72)
Similarly, for the convex function f(x, y, t) , ln(1+1/xy)1/t,
one has the following inequality for every x > 0, y > 0, t > 0,
x¯ > 0, y¯ > 0 and t¯ > 0,
ln(1 + 1/xy)
t
= f(x, y, t)
≥ f(x¯, y¯, t¯) + 〈∇f(x¯, y¯, t¯), (x, y, t)
−(x¯, y¯, t¯)〉
=
2 ln(1 + 1/x¯y¯)
t¯
+
1/x¯y¯
t¯(1 + 1/x¯y¯)
(2
−x/x¯− y/y¯)− ln(1 + 1/x¯y¯)
t¯2
t (73)
Analogously, the inequality
− ln(1 + x)
t
≥ 2α− ln(1 + x¯)
t¯
+
x¯
t¯(1 + x¯)
− x
t¯(1 + x¯)
− α− ln(1 + x¯)
t¯2
t− α
t
(74)
∀ 0 ≤ x ≤M,α ≥ ln(1 +M) + 0.5
follows from the convexity of function
α− ln(1 + x)
t
over
the trust region 0 ≤ x ≤M .
Lastly, the inequality
ln(1+x/y) ≤ ln(1+ x¯/y¯)+ 1
1 + x¯/y¯
(0.5(x2/x¯+ x¯)/y− x¯/y¯)
(75)
follows from the concavity of function ln(1 + z) and then the
inequality
x = 0.5(x2/x¯+ x¯)− 0.5(x− x¯)2/x¯
≤ 0.5(x2/x¯+ x¯) ∀x > 0, x¯ > 0. (76)
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